INTRODUCTION
The thesis that government unencumbered by a strong legislative is essential for development in developing countries makes a presumption that the executive is committed to developmental goals for the benefit of society. It assumes the government raises and applies resources efficiently and effectively to that end. Any limitations in the shape of shortages of finance, relevant bureaucratic skills and expertise will be lessened over time, as a result of development. This article shows how empirical evidence from Zambia is highly damaging to the thesis. While other observers have identified high-level political corruption as a serious and growing problem, basing their accounts on confidential and journalistic sources especially, far less publicity has been given to the culture of 'financial indiscipline' running throughout the * Peter Burnell is a Professor in the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick. He would like to thank the President of the Republic, Frederick Chiluba, for his personal hospitality for the duration of the fieldwork between January and April 2001. He also thanks Mr. N. M. Chibesakunda, Clerk of the National Assembly, and Chama Mpundu Mfula, Assistant Librarian of the Parliamentary Information and Research Library, Lusaka, for their invaluable assistance. The research would not have been possible without the benefit of grant SGS/00500/G from the Nuffield Foundation. public service. Documentary evidence exists in the published findings of the Auditor-General and Parliament's Public Accounts Committee (PAC) in particular. 'Financial indiscipline' means both behaviour that is undeniably corrupt and a broader complex of attitudes that lead to the unauthorised misuse or wasteful use of scarce public resources, money specifically.
Although it may or may not be intended to procure personal gain 'financial indiscipline' invariably ignores or breaches the regulatory framework. The Zambian case shows how the absence of effective Parliamentary accountability allows these endemic shortcomings in the executive to persist. Effective accountability means not just the scrutiny of public expenditure by Parliament. There must also be some institutional mechanism, of which Parliament could be but a part that requires the executive to take note of and respond appropriately to the recommendations of Parliament. In regard to evidence of financial irregularities, effective accountability would mean that the government should face a serious possibility of incurring political costs and/or legal sanctions, in the event of not taking adequate corrective and remedial action.
There is a nest of principal-agent relationships in which agency problems arise when, in some instances agents act in accordance with the principal's wishes and in other instances their conduct is at variance with the same: both cases can be problematic. The political representatives are central to the problem in as much as they appear to regard public spending as an instrument for maintaining and exercising power, not simply a tool for promoting national development. Power is sought through traditional neo-patrimonial and clientelistic patterns of relationship. This adds a distinctive African flavour to an electoral democracy in which there is a strong concentration of power in the presidency. Although institutional strengthening of the Auditor-General's Office and Public Accounts Committee and capacitybuilding in the administration are essential to improved management of the public finances, they are unlikely to be sufficient. For in general the Parliament's powers are weak -some Members say it is just a rubber stamp; and a journalistic source calls it a 'useless house '. i So, even the addition of a more balanced party system and a greater representation of opposition parties in the legislature may well not be enough. But aside from the constitutional balance of power between executive and legislative, there also needs to be a shift in the political and administrative culture to a situation where policy performance measured by the yardstick of the national good is given priority as the litmus test of good government.
The article proceeds in four parts: a briefing on contemporary Zambia; evidence from Zambia is a small country of around 10 million people that since the mid-1970s has seen average incomes fall to levels among the very lowest in the world. Over 90 per cent of the population are reckoned to exist on the equivalent of under US$2 a day. Gross public external indebtedness rose to one of the highest levels, on a per capita basis. The government's spending comprises around 40 per cent of GDP (Gross Domestic Product); and although its fiscal annual fiscal deficits have been reducing they still represent around 2.3 per cent of GDP.
The state has only a small tax base (tax receipts represent around 17 per cent of GDP), made all the narrower by the trade liberalisation which since the early 1990s has eliminated much traditional import tariff and duty-based revenues. So the government depends greatly on international multilateral and bilateral donors to fund public expenditures. Donor pledges averaged over 30 per cent of the public budget during the years 1994-99 and virtually all of the government's capital expenditure is financed in this way. Given the absence of sustained improvement in economic output and in social development in the 1990s, and notwithstanding significant macro-economic reforms and sweeping privatisation, it would be misleading to say Zambia is truly developing. One glimmer of hope is the prospect of early qualification for debt relief worth up to US$3.8billion (out of a total debt stock of $6.8 billion), spread over 22
years. In this way the donors' heavily indebted poor countries initiative would release more of the government's income for spending on the many heavy domestic social and economic priorities. In such circumstances a careful and cost-effective application of public expenditure becomes an issue of even more pressing concern. The government must create confidence that the financial relief would be applied in the best interests of the people, in order to meet the donors' conditions.
Even so, it was precisely with countries like Zambia in mind that the thesis favouring a strong executive and weak legislature emerged as part of the so-called modernisation school of development.
iii The executive would then be able to take tough decisions on spending priorities. It would prioritise investment in the physical and human capital infrastructure so essential to development, at the expense of private consumption. In contrast a relatively powerful legislature could potentially obstruct the decision-making process and thwart needful action by the executive. In a competitive multi-party environment it would all too likely lead to an escalation of demands for public spending particularly for items of immediate consumption, and especially near general elections. In fact since 1991 Zambia has had an only weakly competitive party system, more like a predominant party system. iv The constitutional provision for a powerful executive has been reinforced by the dominant position the governing party, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), has enjoyed in the National Assembly since 1991. It won 125 and 131 of the elected seats in the 1991 and 1996 general elections as well as winning the presidency very comfortably.
However, the fallacy of the modernisation thesis is that it presumes government is committed to pursuing public goals for the public good and will strive do so efficiently and effectively inter alia through a well judged use of the public purse. In Zambia, not only have analysts pointed out the presence of high-level political corruption v but the findings of authoritatively constituted bodies for monitoring and scrutinising the public finances also fail to bear out this presumption. On the contrary, the evidence they provide indicates a problem of 'financial indiscipline' that is much more widespread.
THE OFFICE OF AUDITOR-GENERAL AND THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE
The President appoints the Auditor-General. The constitution requires this nomination to be subject to ratification by Parliament. The AG's mission statement is 'to promote accountability, economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the collection, disbursement and utilisation of funds and other resources for the benefit of society'. vi The Office has seven divisions covering different government responsibilities and four regional offices. While the production of an annual report is a constitutional requirement the AG can also issue interim and special reports, such as in its 1998 report on the disastrous financial position of the University of Zambia, which owed debts exceeding K23 billion. Since 1994 it has been entitled to undertake valuefor-money or performance audits -something the PAC began to apply in 1998 when it investigated the considerable sums ($27 million per annum by 1997) spent on maintaining the foreign missions of the diplomatic service. (The PAC found no value-for-money objectives to test, because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not provided the missions with a mission statement: they had been given no instruction to promote Zambia's economic interests, for example). vii In December 1997 the AG signed an aid-funded programme for capacitybuilding, with the Norwegian government, which is still on-going. Views differ on how much progress has actually been made since then. One perception is that the profile of both the AG and PAC has been increasing, such that Controlling Officers in the ministries are now less inclined to delegate to subordinates the task of responding to the AG's inquiries. Also, the reports of the AG, like those of the PAC attract some media attention. A brief selection of the reports' findings is published in the state-owned and government-run daily newspapers, the unretired imprest; missing receipt books; failure to collect rates; the funding of non-existent projects; fraud; illegal payments; misapplication of funds and various irregularities in procurement; diversion of funds, advances given illegally to non-council employees; irregular payment of allowances; as well as the non-production of financial reports. In urban councils the average delay in auditing accounts appears to be around eight years (in 1997 the most recent audit by one council was 1971). The Committee voiced special concern over the misuse of monies from the Constituency Development Funds. These Funds are meant to support development projects decided at the local level. In a number of cases they appear to function as 'slush funds' for purely party activities, controlled by MMD activists who dominate the local committees deciding the expenditure. There was also evidence of MPs making use of the monies for personal ends. Another general finding concerned the tenants of council houses who opted to acquire the property under a central government directive to local authorities to dispose of their housing stock. Many had ceased paying rent but had not paid for the property (some had even sold the property on, for a higher price than the value owing to the council).
The local authorities lost out on all counts. Although central government has been instrumental in bringing about the financial crisis in local government and has allowed the situation to develop unchecked, it disclaims responsibility for sorting out the mess. 
ANALYSIS
First it is helpful to understand that there is a nest of principal -agent relationships bound up in these issues of public finance and accountability. While the ultimate principal actor is society, and government is society's agent, Parliament -a device to render government accountable -is supposed to represent the principal, the people. Whereas the PAC clearly acts in behalf of Parliament, the AG's place, in contrast, is contested. It describes itself as an agent of parliament: after all, the institution was established by Act of Parliament and the audit is a way of checking the government's reports to Parliament. But the power of appointment lies with the president, subject to ratification by parliament, and in the first instance the AG delivers its report to the President, who then lays it before the house. The Office of AG is actually part of the civil service; the executive determines the AG's budget and the AuditorGeneral himself has no direct control over staff movements in and out. The AG has no powers to take punitive action against the executive where it finds evidence of misbehaviour. At times not only have senior government spokesmen referred to the AG as an agent of the government whose task is to help the executive, but this has been the perception of some MPs also. Their confidence in an institution that they see as being 'under the government' is affected accordingly. In 1996 the government rejected a recommendation of the Constitutional Review
Commission that the AG be styled an officer of the National Assembly. The Commission believed that removal of the link with the Presidency would enhance the AG's effectiveness, especially if security of tenure was granted and the conditions of service and funding allocations were determined by a committee of the house independently of the executive.
Within the executive there are a number of principal-agent relationships: between the political executive and the bureaucratic executive; between the MOFED on the one side and, on the other side the Controlling Officers in ministries, departments, parastatals and other government agencies; and between the Controlling Officers and subordinate accounting officers, and between the last and more junior functionaries in the administration. The extent to which, at any level the behaviour of an agent owes to the intervention or example set by a principal, or instead defies a principal, can be difficult to establish from the outside. The same is true of whether the principals' own conduct has been legitimate or, instead has directed agents to behave in ways contrary to the regulations. Put simply, who should be blamed when things go wrong, and how do we know? These are the questions that the AG and PAC endeavour to address. At times their inquiries appear to have met with obfuscation. And while their findings indicate that 'financial indiscipline' is highly diffuse, the disposition of many of the reports has been to focus most closely on the Controlling Officers. Thus administrative shortcomings and a shortage of expertise within the bureaucratic executive are only part of the problem; another important element has been a lack of political will to address the 'financial indiscipline' or its underlying causes. Put differently there is complicity by powerful political figures in the executive in the way resources are misused.
Permanent Secretaries in line departments act as their principals require; the political boss counts for more than the auditor. xxx There are many hints of this in the committee's reports although they tend to be sotto voce. Take for example the experience of the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP). This is a donor-driven retrenchment programme that has the aim of reducing government's recurrent expenditure, thereby releasing revenue both for investment and to enable higher salaries to be offered to attract high calibre personnel to the bureaucracy.
The government says the programme is responsible for lowering morale and spreading indiscipline in the public service. However the PAC found that in the early years the PSRP was sabotaged by political interference from Cabinet Office, which eroded the authority, powers and entitlements of the programme's Director-General. Then, after the World Bank became impatient to see progress, the government proceeded to spend in one year four times the amount it had earmarked for the programme in the annual budget. Resources were diverted from other essential expenditure heads. Subsequently the Committee on Government
Assurances cited 'apparent undue political influence' on heads of department and the operations of the civil service and discovered that despite a substantial reduction of employees on the payroll by 1999 there was no corresponding reduction in the wage bill, due to financial mismanagement. overruled. We must remember that in Zambia as in many parts of Africa neo-patrimonialism and clientelistic arrangements provide a deeply rooted way of life, with origins that predate colonial rule; personal loyalties formed around the exchange of favours take precedence over legal contractual regulations. In this context a discretionary approach to using public resources, and latitude in ignoring wholly or in part the formal procedures governing public spending decisions and disbursements, are embedded ways of maintaining relationships of power. A reasonable presumption is that this culture within the political executive provides opportunities for personal gain. But what is less often remarked is that, in a system where patronage cascades, it provides the top leadership with a weapon of control that has a powerful reach. For when the 'big man' starts to squeeze the 'middle man' the latter's ability to command the loyalty of his/her clients is also impaired.
A notable example was the extensive practice of large scale borrowing from the state's Food Reserve Agency (FRA) for purchases of maize and fertiliser, in which at least 38 ministers and deputy ministers, 84 MPs and 37 opposition politicians took part. They were able to use these benefits to 'purchase' local political support and social standing. But their unpaid debts to the FRA, totalling K16 billion, subsequently featured in steps by the President to inhibit colleagues from disobeying his wishes where the President's own political interests were at stake, by the simple expedient of threatening to call in the loans. xxxvi The FRA's bad financial state in turn destroyed its capability to offer security to international agencies that might have been prepared to finance bulk fertiliser imports. That has meant the government is repeatedly unable to make fertiliser available to farmers at the start of the growing season, with predictably adverse consequences for the agricultural yield. In most years Zambia continues to experience a large food deficit in maize, the staple crop.
WINNERS AND LOSERS
There are winners, where overspending is rife and year after year seems to go unchecked. And there are losers who never receive anything like full disbursement even of the monies that Parliament has voted, let alone the larger amounts they requested during the annual budget preparations. So, however much the issue of 'financial indiscipline' in the public sector is a matter for executive-legislative relations and is not confined within the bureaucratic realm, the problem also features in relations within the political executive (and, indeed within ruling party). This point merits elaboration.
The distorting effects of 'financial indiscipline' on the distribution of scarce public resources have consistently favoured spending on general services, the machinery of state, rather than functions directly relevant to the economy and social well-being. An example is the overnment's annual spending on cell phone usage of K50 billion, which equates to the entire In its inaugural year the Estimates Committee rightly gave priority to considering the entire budget procedure over the content of the forthcoming budget. It expressed concern that the process, format and timing of the budget all obstruct transparency and public participation. 
RECENT PROGRESS, FUTURE PROSPECTS
The story so far is one of endemic 'financial indiscipline' in the public sector. It is deeply rooted and not just a recent development. Indeed, in giving evidence to the Constitution Commission in 1990 the Office of the Auditor-General said 'the Executive have come to take for granted that no action or non implementation of the recommendations (of the Public Accounts Committee) is not punishable'. liv The AG's latest findings indicate the problems persist unabated. The AG's report for 1999 draws attention to over Kwacha32.9 billion in misappropriation and misapplication including sums at State House, and says it is apparent that MOFED 'has not taken any serious reviews of the internal control system'. lv It is safe to assume that the country's development prospects continue to be undermined. The cry of 'insufficient funds' features in over a third of the explanations the government routinely offers for its failure to execute promises and the undertakings it makes to the house. Its Action-Taken
Reports identify capital projects as the chief victims; 'still looking for funds' is a common form of reply.
For this situation to improve it is worth distinguishing between the kinds of incremental reform that might help to improve the functioning of the AG and PAC within an unchanged political context, and more fundamental changes to the underlying conditions.
Modest Incremental Reforms
The second half of the 1990s saw some signs that the problem was at last being recognised and there were a few steps forward. There was a greater commitment by the state to prepare and submit annual financial reports. lvi Formerly, the late or non-production of financial accounts Thus while a strengthening of the formal institutional mechanisms is necessary it is very unlikely to be sufficient for the installation of greater financial discipline in the public sector. In the past the government has behaved as if it believed the scrutiny activities of the PAC constituted an end in itself -a sufficient response to the problem, one that obviated the need for government to take special action. But even though the PAC is a dog that increasingly barks, the fact is, it still has no bite: 'It seems as if, year in and year out ' the annual presentation of the PAC report 'is for record purposes only'; its recommendations 'should not only end in our draws. The Executive must act on some of these recommendations'. lxii As with all the other committees the chief threat the PAC can make is to keep revisiting the same issues over and over again. This will not worry a government that feels secure. And the government will feel secure so long as the ruling party dominates the house. First there is the 'payroll' vote numbering up to 68 MPs. Second, the great majority of back-benchers take no part in the debates on the PAC reports, which tend to be monopolised by the Committee's members and ministers who reply. In 1997 and 1998 only three MMD back-bench MPs came anywhere close to the average number of interventions made by the handful of opposition party and Independent MPs. Thus an essential condition for reformed arrangements of parliamentary accountability to be effective is a more genuinely pluralist party system, where a strong political opposition is minded to put the government under pressure.
A second necessary condition is a package of constitutional measures that goes beyond the budget process and the immediate mechanisms for financial accountability. There is an outside possibility that just such a review might take place if the general elections due at the end of October 2001 produce a change of government. But even then the consequences cannot be predicted with certainty. For example any changes that made ministers or the party in power feel less secure could have the effect of introducing greater party discipline into committee proceedings. This would be made even more likely if the press were in attendance, as the parliamentary reforms committee recommends. A confrontational atmosphere that eroded the cross-party approach to committee work would not be an advance on the present situation and could be counter-productive.
The Zambian state cannot possibly be expected to meet all of the country's many urgent social and economic needs. That said, the evidence suggests that the government has often used lack of money as an excuse for inaction and its reluctance to strengthen the institutions of accountability, when financial mismanagement has been an important constraint on progress. High-level political corruption represents only the 'tip of the iceberg'. 'Financial indiscipline' has been endemic throughout the public sector. None of the specific proposals for reform, however affordable, offer a guaranteed solution. If a new generation of politicians manoeuvres close to power then they too might be seduced by proximity to the resources at the government's disposal. Without some sort of cultural change there is always the risk that traditional approaches which appear to treat public expenditure more as an instrument for the exercise and retention of power than as a means to promote national development, will continue to prevail. There needs to be a shift in the public philosophy toward a performancebased system -one where the government's performance is judged in non-particularistic, nonpatrimonial terms. A sea change in the bureaucratic culture is also required. For at the end of the day responsibility for many of the shortcomings highlighted by the AG and PAC lies not so much with the absence of a watertight regulatory regime but with a systematic failure to apply the existing regulations and internal control mechanisms. Reports (1991 and 1995) . Recommendations 32/45: oblige ministers to defend budget proposals before the departmentally-related committees, as a regular part of the budget process.
